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Anti-clustering in the national SARS-CoV-2 daily infection counts
Boudewijn F. Roukema1,2,ORCID
Abstract The noise in daily infection counts of an epidemic should be super-Poissonian due to intrinsic
epidemiological and administrative clustering. Here, we use this clustering to classify the official national SARS-
CoV-2 daily infection counts and check for infection counts that are unusual by being anti-clustered. We adopt a
one-parameter model of φ′i infections per cluster, dividing any daily count ni into ni/φ
′
i ‘clusters’, for ‘country’ i.
We assume that ni/φ
′
i on a given day j is drawn from a Poisson distribution whose mean is robustly estimated
from the 4 neighbouring days, and calculate the inferred Poisson probability P ′ij of the observation. The P
′
ij values
should be uniformly distributed. We find the value φi that minimises the Kolmogorov–Smirnov distance from a
uniform distribution. We investigate the (φi, Ni) distribution, for total infection count Ni. We consider consecutive
count sequences above a threshold of 50 daily infections. We find that most of the daily infection count sequences
are inconsistent with a Poissonian model. All are consistent with the φi model. Clustering increases with total
infection count for the full sequences: φi ∼
√
Ni. The 28-, 14- and 7-day least noisy sequences for several countries
are best modelled as sub-Poissonian, suggesting a distinct epidemiological family. The 28-day sequences of DZ, BY,
TR, AE have strongly sub-Poissonian preferred models, with φ28i < 0.5; and FI, SA, RU, AL, IR have φ
28
i < 3.0.
Independent verification may be warranted for those countries with unusually low clustering.
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Introduction
The daily counts of new, laboratory-confirmed infec-
tions with severe acute respiratory syndrome coron-
avirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) constitute one of the key statis-
tics followed by citizens and health agencies around
the world in the ongoing 2019–2020 coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic [9, 19]. Can these counts
be classified in a way that makes as few epidemiological
assumptions as possible, as motivation for deeper anal-
ysis to either validate or invalidate the counts? While
full epidemiological modelling and prediction is a vital
component of COVID-19 research [e.g. 6, 15, 23, 13, 3],
these cannot be accurately used to study the pandemic
as a whole – a global phenomenon by definition – if the
data at the global level is itself inaccurate. Knowledge
of the global state of the current pandemic is weakened
if any of the national-level SARS-CoV-2 infection data
have been artificially interfered with by the health agen-
cies providing that data or by other actors involved in
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the chain of data lineage [34]. Since personal medical
data are private information, only a limited number of
individuals at health agencies are expected to be able
to check the validity of these counts based on origi-
nal records. Nevertheless, artificial interventions in the
counts could potentially reveal themselves in statistical
properties of the counts. Unusual statistical properties
in a wide variety of quantitative data sometimes ap-
pear, for example, as anomalies related to Benford’s
law [24, 25], as in the 2009 first round of the Iranian
presidential election [29, 30, 20].
Here, we check the compatibility of noise in the offi-
cial national SARS-CoV-2 daily infection counts, Ni(t),
for country1 i on date t, with expectations based on the
Poisson distribution [27]. It is unlikely that any real
count data will quite match the theoretical Poisson dis-
tribution, both due to the complexity of the logical tree
of time-dependent intrinsic epidemiological infection as
well as administrative effects in the SARS-CoV-2 test-
ing procedures, and the sub-national and national level
procedures for collecting and validating data to produce
a national health agency’s official report. In particular,
1 No position is taken in this paper regarding jurisdiction
over territories; the term ‘country’ is intended here as a neu-
tral term without supporting or opposing the formal notion
of state. Apart from minor changes for technical reasons, the
‘countries’ are defined by the data sources.
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clusters of infections on a scale of φ′i infections per clus-
ter, either intrinsic or in the testing and administrative
pipeline, would tend to cause relative noise to increase
from a fraction of 1/
√
Ni for pure Poisson noise up to√
φ′i/Ni, greater by a factor of
√
φ′i. This overdisper-
sion has been found, for example, for COVID-19 death
rate counts in the United States [15].
In contrast, it is difficult to see how anti-Poissonian
smoothing effects could occur, unless they were imposed
administratively. For example, an administrative office
might impose (or have imposed on it by political au-
thorities) a constraint to validate a fixed or slowly and
smoothly varying number of SARS-CoV-2 test result
files per day, independently of the number received or
queued; this would constitute an example of an artifi-
cial intervention in the counts that would weaken the
epidemiological usefulness of the data.
A one-parameter model to allow for the clustering is
proposed in this paper, and used to classify the counts.
We allow the parameter to take on an effective anti-
clustering value, in order to allow the data to freely
determine its optimal value. For more in-depth models
of clustering, called “burstiness” in stochastic models of
discrete event counts, power-law models have also been
proposed [5, 8].
The method is presented in §Method. The section
§SARS-CoV-2 infection data describes the choice of data
set and the definition, for any given country, of a con-
secutive time sequence that has high enough daily in-
fection counts for Poisson distribution analysis to be
reasonable. The method of analysis is given in §Analysis.
Results are presented in §Results. Qualitative discussion
of the results is given in §Discussion and conclusions are
summarised in §Conclusion. This work is intended to be
fully reproducible by independent researchers using the
Maneage framework: see commit 252cf1c of the git
repository https://codeberg.org/boud/subpoisson and
the archive zenodo.3951152.
Method
SARS-CoV-2 infection data
Two obvious choices of a dataset for national daily
SARS-CoV-2 counts would be those provided by the
World Health Organization (WHO)2 or those curated
by the Wikipedia WikiProject COVID-19 Case Count
Task Force3 in medical cases chart templates (hereafter,
2 https://covid19.who.int/WHO-COVID-19-global-data.
csv; (archive)
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Wikipedia:WikiProject COVID-19/Case Count
Task Force&oldid=967874960
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Fig. 1 Number Njump of sudden jumps or drops in counts on
adjacent days in WHO and Wikipedia WikiProject COVID-
19 Case Count Task Force medical cases chart national daily
SARS-CoV-2 infection counts for countries present in both
data sets. A line illustrates equal quality of the two data
sets. The C19CCTF version of the data is clearly less af-
fected by sudden jumps than the WHO data. Plain text table:
zenodo.3951152/WHO vs WP jumps.dat.
C19CCTF). While WHO has published a wide vari-
ety of documents related to the COVID-19 pandemic,
it does not appear to have published details of how
national reports are communicated to it and collated.
Given that most government agencies and systems of
government procedures tend to lack transparency, de-
spite significant moves towards forms of open govern-
ment [e.g. 37] in many countries, data lineage trac-
ing from national governments to WHO is likely to
be difficult in many cases. In contrast, the curation of
official government SARS-CoV-2 daily counts by the
Wikipedia WikiProject COVID-19 Case Count Task
Force follows a well-established technology of tracking
data lineage.
Unfortunately, it is clear that in the WHO data,
there are several cases where two days’ worth of de-
tected infections appear to be listed by WHO as a se-
quence of two days j and j + 1 on which all the in-
fections are allocated to the second of the two days,
with zero infections on the first of the pair. There are
also some sequences in the WHO data where the day
listed with zero infections is separated by several days
from a nearby day with double the usual amount of
infections. This is very likely an effect of difficulties in
correctly managing world time zones, or time zone and
sleep schedule effects, in any of several levels of the
chains of communication between health agencies and
WHO. In other words, there are several cases where a
temporary sharp jump or drop in the counts appears in
the data but is most likely a timing artefact. Whatever
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the reason for the effect, this effect will tend to confuse
the epidemiological question of interest here: the aim is
to globally characterise the noise and to highlight coun-
tries where unusual smoothing may have taken place.
We quantify this jump/drop problem as follows. We
consider a pair of days j, j+1 for a given country to be
a jump if the absolute difference in counts, |ni(j+1)−
ni(j)|, is greater than the mean, (ni(j + 1) + ni(j))/2.
In the case of a pair in which one value is zero, the ratio
is two, and the condition is satisfied. We evaluate the
number of jumps Njump for both the WHO data and
the C19CCTF medical cases chart data, starting, for
any given country, from the first day with at least 50
infections. Figure 1 shows Njump for the 130 countries
in common to the two data sets; there are 216 countries
in the WHO data set and 132 in the C19CCTF data. It
is clear that most countries have fewer jumps or drops
in the Wikipedia data set than in the WHO data set.
Thus, at least for the purposes of understand-
ing intrinsic and administrative clustering, the
C19CCTF medical cases chart data appear to be
the better curated version of the national daily
SARS-CoV-2 infection counts as reported by offi-
cial agencies. The detailed download and extraction
script of national daily SARS-CoV-2 infection data
from these templates and the resulting data file
zenodo.3951152/WP C19CCTF SARSCoV2.dat are
available in the reproducibility package associated with
this paper (§Code availability). Dates without data are
omitted; this should have an insignificant effect on the
analysis if these are due to low infection counts.
The full set of data includes many days, especially
for countries or territories (as defined by the data
source) of low populations, with low values, including
zero and one. The standard deviation of a Poisson dis-
tribution of expectation value N is
√
N [27], giving a
fractional error of 1/
√
N . Even taking into account clus-
tering or anticlustering of data, inclusion of these peri-
ods of close to zero infection counts would contribute
noise that would overwhelm the signal from the periods
of higher infection rates for the same or other coun-
tries. In the time sequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection
counts, chaos in the administrative reactions to the ini-
tial stages of the pandemic will tend to create extra
noise, so it is reasonable to choose a moderately high
threshold at which the start and end of a consecutive se-
quence of days should be defined for analysis. Here, we
set the threshold for a sequence to start at a minimum
of 50 infections in a single day. The sequence is contin-
ued for at least 7 days (if available in the data), and
stops when the counts drop below the same threshold
for 2 consecutive days. The cutoff criterion of 2 con-
secutive days avoids letting the analysable sequence be
too sensitive to individual days of low fluctuations. If
the resulting sequence includes less than 7 days, the
sequence is rejected as having insufficient signal to be
analysed.
Analysis
Poissonian and φ′i models: full sequences We first
consider the full count sequence {ni(j), 1 ≤ j ≤
Ti} for each country i, with Ti valid days of analy-
sis as defined in §SARS-CoV-2 infection data. Our one-
parameter model assumes that the counts are predom-
inantly grouped in clusters, each with φ′i infections
per cluster. Thus, the daily count ni(j) is assumed to
consist of ni(j)/φ
′
i infection events. We assume that
ni(j)/φ
′
i on a given day is drawn from a Poisson distri-
bution of mean µ̂i(j)/φ
′
i. We set µ̂i(j) to the median of
the 4 neighbouring days, excluding day j and centred
on it. For the initial sequence of 2 days, µ̂i(j) is set to
µ̂i(3), and µ̂i(j) for the final 2 days is set to µ̂i(Ti− 2).
By modelling µ̂i as a median of a small number of neigh-
bouring days, our model is almost identical to the data
itself and statistically robust, with only mild depen-
dence on the choices of parameters. This definition of
a model is more likely to bias the resulting analysis
towards underestimating the noise on scales of several
days rather than overestimating it; this method will not
detect oscillations on the time scale of a few days to a
fortnight that are related to the SARS-CoV-2 incuba-
tion time [10]. For any given value φ′i, we calculate the
cumulative probability P ′ij that ni(j)/φ
′
i is drawn from
a Poisson distribution of mean µ̂i(j)/φ
′
i. For country
i, the values P ′ij should be drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution if the model is a fair approximation. In par-
ticular, for φ′i set to unity, P
′
ij should be drawn from
a uniform distribution if the intrisic data distribution
is Poissonian. Individual values of P ′ij (close to zero or
one) could, in principle, be used to identify individual
days that are unusual, but here we do not consider these
further.
We allow a wide logarithmic range in values of φ′i,
allowing the unrealistic domain of φ′i < 1, and find the
value φi that minimises the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS)
distance [16, 32] from a uniform distribution, i.e. that
maximises the KS probability that the data are consis-
tent with a uniform distribution, when varying φ′i. The
one-sample KS test is a non-parametric test that com-
pares a data sample with a chosen theoretical probabil-
ity distribution, yielding the probability that the sam-
ple is drawn randomly from the theoretical distribution.
We label the corresponding KS probability as PKSi . We
4 Boudewijn F. Roukema
write PPoissi := P
KS
i (φ
′
i = 1) to check if any country’s
daily infection rate sequence is consistent with Poisso-
nian, although this is likely to be rare, as stated above:
super-Poissonian behaviour seems reasonable. Of par-
ticular interest are countries with low values of φi. Al-
lowing for a possibly fractal or other power-law nature
of the clustering of SARS-CoV-2 infection counts, we
consider the possibility that the optimal values φi may
be dependent on the total infection count Ni. We inves-
tigate the (φi, Ni) distribution and see whether a scal-
ing type relation exists, allowing for a corrected statistic
ψi to be defined in order to highlight the noise structure
of the counts independent of the overall scale Ni of the
counts.
Standard errors in φi for a given country i are es-
timated once φi has been obtained by assuming that
µ̂i(j) and φi are correct and generating 30 Poisson ran-
dom simulations of the full sequence for that country.
Since the scales of interest vary logarithmically, the
standard deviation of the best estimates of log10 φi for
these numerical simulations is used as an estimate of
σ(log10 φi), the logarithmic standard error in φi.
Subsequences Since artificial interference in
daily SARS-CoV-2 infection counts for a given
country might be restricted to shorter periods
than the full data sequence, we also analyse 28-
, 14- and 7-day subsequences. These analyses
are performed using the same methods as above
(§Poissonian and φ′i models: full sequences), except that
the 28-, 14- or 7-day subsequence that minimises φi is
found. The search over all possible subsequences would
require calculation of a Sˇida`k-Bonferonni correction
factor [1] to judge how anomalous they are. The KS
probabilities that we calculate need to be interpreted
keeping this in mind. Since the subsequences for a given
country overlap, they are clearly not independent from
one another. Instead, the a posteriori interpretation
of the results of the subsequence searches found here
should at best be considered indicative of periods that
should be considered interesting for further verification.
Results
Data
The 132 countries and territories in the C19CCTF
counts data have 19 negative values out of the total
of 16367 values. These can reasonably be interpreted
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Fig. 2 Probability of the noise in the country-level
daily SARS-CoV-2 counts being consistent with a Pois-
son point process, PPoiss
i
, shown as red circles; and prob-
ability PKS
i
(φi) for the φi clustering model proposed here
(§Poissonian and φ′
i
models: full sequences), shown as green X
symbols, versus Ni, the total number of officially recorded in-
fections for that country. The horizontal axis is logarithmic.
As discussed in the text (§Full infection count sequences), the
Poisson point process is unrealistic for most of these data,
while the φi clustering model is consistent with the data for
all countries. Plain text table: zenodo.3951152/phi N full.dat.
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Fig. 3 Noisiness in daily SARS-CoV-2
counts, showing the clustering parameter φi
(§Poissonian and φ′
i
models: full sequences) that best models
the noise, versus the total number of counts for that country
Ni. The error bars show standard errors derived from
numerical (bootstrap) simulations based on the model.
The axes are logarithmic, as indicated. Values of the
clustering parameter φi below unity indicate sub-Poissonian
behaviour – the counts in these cases are less noisy than
expected for Poisson statistics. A robust (Theil–Sen [33, 31])
linear fit of log10 φi against log10Ni is shown as a thick
green line (§Full infection count sequences). Plain text table:
zenodo.3951152/phi N full.dat.
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Fig. 4 Normalised noisiness ψi (Eq. (1)) for daily SARS-
CoV-2 counts versus total counts Ni. The error bars are as
in Fig. 3, assuming no additional error source contributed by
Ni. The axes are logarithmic. A few low ψi values appear to
be outliers of the ψi distribution.
Table 1 Clustering parameters for the countries with the
10 lowest φi and 10 lowest ψi values (least noise); extended
version of table: zenodo.3951152/phi N full.dat.
Country Ni PPoissi P
KS
i
φi ψi
DZ 23691 0.30 0.65 0.89 0.005
FI 7347 0.35 0.98 1.72 0.020
BY 66348 0.09 0.89 2.11 0.008
AL 3906 0.23 0.83 2.57 0.041
HR 4422 0.27 0.93 3.24 0.048
AE 57193 0.00 0.70 3.35 0.014
NZ 1557 0.45 0.94 4.32 0.109
AU 12450 0.11 0.93 5.07 0.045
TH 3255 0.29 0.99 5.37 0.094
DK 13466 0.00 0.98 5.56 0.047
DZ 23691 0.30 0.65 0.89 0.005
BY 66348 0.09 0.89 2.11 0.008
RU 783328 0.00 0.92 10.35 0.011
AE 57193 0.00 0.70 3.35 0.014
SA 255825 0.00 0.85 9.02 0.017
FI 7347 0.35 0.98 1.72 0.020
IR 276202 0.00 0.77 12.73 0.024
TR 220572 0.00 0.44 12.30 0.026
IN 1155191 0.00 0.80 33.88 0.031
AL 3906 0.23 0.83 2.57 0.041
as corrections for earlier overcounts, and we reset these
values to zero with a negligible reduction in the amount
of data. Consecutive day sequences satisfying the crite-
ria listed in §SARS-CoV-2 infection data were found for
68 countries.
Clustering of SARS-CoV-2 counts
Full infection count sequences Figure 2 shows, un-
surprisingly, that only a small handful of the countries’
daily SARS-CoV-2 counts sequences have noise whose
statistical distribution is consistent with the Poisson
distribution, in the sense modelled here: PPoissi (red cir-
cles) is close to zero in most cases. On the contrary, the
introduction of the φ′i parameter, optimised to φi for
country i, provides a sufficient fit in all cases; none of
the probabilities (PKSi (φi), green X symbols) in Fig. 2
is low enough to be considered a significant rejection.
The consistency of the φi model with the data justi-
fies continuing to Figure 3, which clearly shows a scaling
relation: countries with greater overall numbers Ni of
infections also tend to have greater noise in the daily
counts ni(j). A Theil–Sen linear fit [33, 31] to the re-
lation between log10 φi and log10Ni has a zeropoint of
−0.71± 0.32 and a slope of 0.44± 0.08, where the stan-
dard errors (68% confidence intervals if the distribution
is Gaussian) are conservatively generated for both slope
and zeropoint by 100 bootstraps. By using a robust es-
timator, the low φi cases, which appear to be outliers,
have little influence on the fit. The fit is shown as a
thick green line in Fig. 3.
This φi–Ni relation is consistent with φi ∝
√
Ni. To
adjust the φi clustering value to take into account the
dependence on Ni, and given that the slope is consis-
tent with this simple relation, we propose the empirical
definition of a normalised clustering parameter
ψi := φi/
√
Ni , (1)
so that ψi should, by construction, be approximately
constant. While the estimated slope of the relation
could be used rather than this half-integer power re-
lation, the fixed relation in Eq. (1) offers the benefit of
simplicity.
This relation should not be confused with the usual
Poisson error. By the divisibility of the Poisson distri-
bution, the relation φi ∝
√
Ni found here can be used
to show that
σ[µ̂i(j)/φi] ∼
√
µ̂i(j)/φi
⇒ σ[µ̂i(j)] ∼ φi
√
µ̂i(j)/φi ∝ N1/4i µ̂i(j)1/2 , (2)
where σ[x] is the standard deviation of random variable
x. If we accept µ̂i(j) as a fair model for ni(j) and that
ni(j) is proportional to Ni, then we obtain
σ[ni(j)] ∝ n3/4i . (3)
Figure 4 shows visually that ψi appears to be scale-
independent, in the sense that the dependence on Ni
has been cancelled, by construction. The countries with
the 10 lowest values of ψi are those with ISO 3166-1
alpha-2 codes DZ, BY, RU, AE, SA, FI, IR, TR, IN,
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Fig. 5 Clustering parameter φi for 28-day sequence with
lowest φi, as in Fig. 3. The vertical axis range is expanded
from that in Fig. 3, to accommodate lower values A robust
(Theil–Sen [33, 31]) linear fit of log10 φ
28
i
against log10Ni is
shown as a thick green line (§Full infection count sequences).
Plain text table: zenodo.3951152/phi N 28days.dat.
Table 2 Least noisy 28-day sequences – clustering parame-
ters for the countries with the 10 lowest φ28
i
values; extended
table: zenodo.3951152/phi N 28days.dat.
country Ni 〈n28i 〉 P
Poiss
i
PKS
i
φ28
i
starting
date
DZ 23691 154.1 0.10 0.80 0.17 2020-05-13
BY 66348 921.9 0.14 0.92 0.21 2020-05-08
TR 220572 1131.2 0.08 0.86 0.21 2020-06-23
AE 57193 512.8 0.08 0.23 0.23 2020-04-14
FI 7347 83.4 0.99 0.99 0.92 2020-04-15
SA 255825 1182.2 0.47 0.55 1.11 2020-04-12
RU 783328 6946.0 0.82 0.95 1.36 2020-06-17
AL 3906 74.6 0.23 0.83 2.57 2020-06-21
IR 276202 1863.3 0.20 0.98 2.85 2020-03-30
HR 4422 60.2 0.27 0.93 3.24 2020-03-28
AL. Detailed SARS-CoV-2 daily count noise character-
istics for the countries with lowest φi and ψi are listed
in Table 1, including Kolmogorov–Smirnov probability
that the data are drawn from a Poisson distribution,
PPoissi , the probability of the optimal φi model, P
KS
i ,
and φi and ψi.
The approximate proportionality of φi to
√
Ni for
the full sequences is strong and helps separate low-
noise SARS-CoV-2 count countries from those following
the main trend. However, the results for subsequences
shown below in §Subsequences of infection counts sug-
gest that this Ni dependence may be an effect of the
typically longer durations of the pandemic in countries
where the overall count is higher.
Subsequences of infection counts Figures 5–7 show
the equivalent of Fig. 3 for sequences of lengths 28,
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14-day seq.
Fig. 6 Clustering parameter φi for 14-day se-
quence with lowest φi, as in Fig. 5. Plain text table:
zenodo.3951152/phi N 14days.dat.
Table 3 Least noisy 14-day sequences – clustering parame-
ters for the countries with the 10 lowest φ14
i
values; extended
version of table: zenodo.3951152/phi N 14days.dat.
country Ni 〈n14i 〉 P
Poiss
i
PKS
i
φ14
i
starting
date
AE 57193 521.2 0.11 0.58 0.09 2020-04-19
DZ 23691 144.1 0.11 0.49 0.09 2020-05-23
BY 66348 945.6 0.22 1.00 0.13 2020-05-12
TR 220572 991.6 0.12 0.97 0.13 2020-07-06
SA 255825 1227.5 0.38 0.98 0.30 2020-04-19
KE 12750 126.2 0.22 0.66 0.47 2020-06-03
FI 7347 95.1 0.64 0.98 0.65 2020-04-16
RU 783328 6522.9 0.37 0.42 0.72 2020-07-04
IN 1155191 9409.7 0.62 0.68 0.82 2020-05-30
AL 3906 70.8 0.59 0.92 0.87 2020-06-24
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Fig. 7 Clustering parameter φi for 7-day sequence with low-
est φ7
i
, as in Fig. 5. There is clearly a wider overall scatter
and bigger error bars compared to Figs 5 and 6; a low φ7
i
is a weaker indicator than φ2
i
8 and φ1
i
4. Plain text table:
zenodo.3951152/phi N 07days.dat.
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Table 4 Least noisy 7-day sequences – clustering parameters
for the countries with the 10 lowest φ values; extended table:
zenodo.3951152/phi N 07days.dat.
country Ni 〈n7i 〉 P
Poiss
i
PKS
i
φ7
i
starting
date
AE 57193 544.9 0.24 1.00 0.05 2020-04-27
BY 66348 947.9 0.61 0.97 0.05 2020-05-13
IN 1155191 10109.3 0.34 0.62 0.05 2020-06-06
DZ 23691 188.6 0.20 1.00 0.06 2020-05-20
FI 7347 94.9 0.43 0.56 0.08 2020-04-20
TR 220572 1022.4 0.43 0.97 0.10 2020-07-07
PL 40782 297.7 0.32 0.98 0.16 2020-06-20
PA 54426 171.1 0.89 0.98 0.17 2020-05-09
HN 33835 160.7 0.94 1.00 0.18 2020-06-01
DK 13466 71.1 0.48 0.97 0.28 2020-05-11
14 and 7 days, respectively. The Theil–Sen robust fits
to the logarithmic (φ28i , Ni); (φ
14
i , Ni); and (φ
7
i , Ni) re-
lations are zeropoints and slopes of 0.27 ± 0.33 and
0.15± 0.07; 0.20± 0.59 and 0.10± 0.13; and 0.29± 0.60
and −0.03± 0.13, respectively. There is clearly no sig-
nificant dependence of φdi on Ni for any of these fixed
length subsequences, in contrast to the case of the φi de-
pendence on Ni for the full count sequences. Thus, the
empirical motivation for using ψ (Eq. (1)) to discrim-
inate between the countries’ full sequences of SARS-
CoV-2 data is not justified for the subsequences. Ta-
bles 2–4 show the countries with the least noisy se-
quences as determined by φ28i , φ
14
i and φ
7
i , respectively.
Tables 2 and 3 show that the lists of countries with
the strongest anti-clustering are similar. Thus, Fig. 8
shows the SARS-CoV-2 counts curves for countries with
the lowest φ28i , and Fig. 9 the curves for those with
the lowest φ7i . Both figures exclude countries with total
counts Ni ≤ 10000, in which low total counts tend to
give low clustering. It is clear in these figures that sev-
eral countries have subsequences that are strongly sub-
Poissonian – with some form of anti-clustering, whether
natural or artificial.
Countries in the median of the φ28i and φ
7
i distribu-
tions have their curves shown in Fig. 10 for comparison.
It is visually clear in the figure that the counts are dis-
persed widely beyond the Poissonian band, and that the
φ28i and φ
7
i models are reasonable as a model for rep-
resenting about 68% of the counts within one standard
deviation of the model values.
Discussion
Figures 3 and 4 clearly show that some groups of coun-
tries are unusual in terms of the characteristics of their
location in the (Ni, ψi) plane.
High total infection count
Brazil (BR) and the United States (US) are separated
from the majority of other countries by their high to-
tal infection count. They have correspondingly higher
clustering values φi, although their normalised cluster-
ing values ψi are in the range of about 0.4 < ψi < 10
covered by the majority of countries in Fig. 4.
It does not seem realistic that these two countries’
φi values greater than 300 are purely an effect of intrin-
sic infection events – ‘superspreader’ events in crowded
places or nursing homes. While individual big clusters
may occur given the high overall scale of infections, it
seems more likely that this is administrative clustering.
Both countries are federations, and have numerous geo-
graphic administrative subdivisions with a diversity of
political and administrative methods. A plausible ex-
planation for the dominant effect yielding φi > 300 in
these two countries is that on any individual day, the ar-
rival and full processing of reports depends on a number
of sub-national administrative regions, each reporting a
few hundred new infections.
For example, if there are 10 reporting regions, each
typically reporting 300 infections, then typically (on
about 68% of days) there will be about 7 to 13 re-
ports per day. This would give a range varying from
about 2100 to 3900 cases per day, rather than 2945 to
3055, which would be the case for unclustered, Pois-
sonian counts (since
√
3000 ≈ 55). Lacking a system
that obliges sub-national divisions – and laboratories –
to report their test results in time-continuous fashion
and that validates and collates those reports on a time
scale much shorter than 24 hours, this type of clustering
seems natural in the sociological sense.
Low normalised clustering ψi
In Fig. 4, there appears to be a group of eight countries
that are also separated from the main group of coun-
tries, but by having low normalised noise ψi rather than
just having a high total count Ni.
Low ψi, low Ni, high P
Poiss
i Classifying the countries
by ψi alone (Table 1) would add Finland (FI) to this
group, but in Fig. 4, Finland appears better grouped
with the main body of countries in the (ψi, Ni) plane.
This could be interpreted as Eq. (1) providing insuffi-
cient correction for the φi–Ni relation. Alternatively,
looking at Finland’s entry in Table 2 for 28-day se-
quences, we see that Finland is among the three with
the lowest total (or mean) daily infection counts in the
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Fig. 8 Least noisy 28-day official SARS-CoV-2 national daily counts for countries with total counts Ni > 10000 (see Fig. 5
and Table 2), shown as dots in comparison to the µ̂i(j) model (median of the 4 neighbouring days) and 68% error band for
the Poisson point process. The ranges in daily counts (vertical axis) are chosen automatically and in most cases do not start
at zero. About nine (32%) of the points should be outside of the shaded band unless the counts have an anti-clustering effect
that weakens Poisson noise. A faint shaded band shows the φ28
i
model for the one country here with φi (slightly) greater than
one (RU), but is almost indistinguishable from the Poissonian band. The dates indicate the start date of each sequence.
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shaded band if the counts are Poissonian. In several cases, the data points appear to be mostly stuck to the model, with almost
no scatter.
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Fig. 10 Typical (median) 28-day (above) and 7-day (below) daily counts, as in Figs 8 and 9. The dark shaded band again
shows a Poissonian noise model, which underestimates the noise. A faint shaded band shows the φi models for these countries’
SARS-CoV-2 daily counts, and should contain about 68% of the infection count points.
table, and has the highest consistency with a Poisson
distribution (PPoissi ). Having a low total infection count,
it seems credible that Finland lacks the intrinsic, testing
and administrative clustering of countries with higher
infection counts.
Low ψi, high Ni India (IN) and Russia (RU) have
total infection counts nearly as high (logarithmically)
as Brazil and the US, but have managed to keep their
daily infection rates much less noisy – by about a factor
of 10 to 100 – than would be expected from the general
pattern displayed in the diagram. Despite having of the
order of a million total official SARS-CoV-2 infections
each, these two countries have, as of the download date
of the data, 21 July 2020, avoided having the clustering
effects present in Brazil and the US.
The most divergent case in the high-Ni part of this
group (see Fig. 4 and Table 1) is Russia, which has only
a very modest value of φi = 10.4 × 10±0.073 for its to-
tal infection count of over a million. This would require
that both intrinsic clustering of infection events and
administrative procedures work much more smoothly in
Russia than in the United States, Brazil and, to a lesser
degree, India. Tables 2 and 3 and Fig. 8 show that the
Russian official SARS-CoV-2 counts indeed show very
little noise compared to more typical cases (Fig. 10).
At the intrinsic epidemiological level, this means that
if the Russian counts are to be considered accurate,
then very few clusters – in nursing homes, religious
gatherings, bars, restaurants, schools, shops – can have
occurred. Moreover, laboratory testing and transmis-
sion of data through the administrative chain from lo-
cal levels to the national (federal) health agency must
have occurred without the clustering effects present in
the United States and Brazil and in countries with
more typical clustering values φi, characterising their
daily infection counts. International media interest in
Russian COVID-19 data has mostly focussed on con-
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troversy related to COVID-19 death counts [7], with
apparently no attention given so far to the modestly
super-Poissonian nature of the daily counts, in contrast
to the strongly super-Poissonian counts of other coun-
tries with high total infection counts.
India’s overall position in the (ψi, Ni) plane (Fig. 4
and Table 1) is less extreme than that of Russia, with an
unnormalised clustering parameter φi = 34× 10±0.083.
However, Table 3 shows that despite its large overall in-
fection count, India achieved a 14-day sequence with a
preferred φi value close to unity. Moreover, it has a very
low-ranked φ7i value, as given in Table 4 and illustrated
in Fig. 9. Five values appear almost exactly on the
model curve rather than scattering above and below.
Moreover, the value is just below 10,000. Epidemiolog-
ically, it is not credible to believe that 10,000 officially
reported cases per day should be an attractor resulting
from the pattern of infections and system of reporting.
Given that the value of 10,000 is a round number in the
decimal-based system, a reasonable speculation would
be that the daily counts for India were artificially held
at just below 10,000 for several days. The crossing of
the 10,000 psychological threshold of daily infections
was noted in the media [28], but the lack of noise in the
counts during the week preceding the crossing of the
threshold appears to have gone unnoticed. After cross-
ing the 10,000 threshold, the daily infections in India
continued increasing, as can be seen in the full counts
(zenodo.3951152/WP C19CCTF SARSCoV2.dat).
Low ψi, low φi, medium Ni Among the group of eight
low ψi countries, Table 1 shows that only one country
has its full data set (as defined here) best modelled
by the ordinary Poisson point process. Algeria (DZ)
appears to have completely avoided clustering effects,
with φi close to unity. Figure 8 shows the least noisy 28-
day sequence for Algeria. Only one day of SARS-CoV-
2 recorded infections appears to have diverged beyond
the Poissonian 68% band, rather than about nine, the
expected number for a Poissonian distribution. Most of
the points appear to stick very closely to the model. It is
difficult to imagine a natural process for obtaining this
sub-Poissonian noise (as preferred by the φi model), es-
pecially in the context where most countries have super-
Poissonian daily counts. In a frequentist interpretation,
the least noisy Algerian 28-day count sequence would be
considered only mildly, not significantly, unusual, since
it is consistent with a Poisson distribution, with only
a weak rejection (Tables 2–4). However, as a member
of the general class of countries’ SARS-CoV-2 daily in-
fection count curves, use of the φi model would appear
to be justified. It is in this sense that the sequence can
be considered sub-Poissonian. Moreover, a full Bayesian
analysis would need to consider independent credibility
criteria.
In line with the counts for India that appeared to be
smooth just below a round-number boundary of 10,000
infections per day, the least noisy 7-day sequence for
Algeria, shown in Fig. 9, might appear to have been
affected by a similar psychological boundary of 200 in-
fections per day. Medical specialists interviewed by the
media interpreted the 200 daily infections period as rep-
resenting stability and resulting from partial lockdown
measures, without providing an explanation for why
Poisson noise was nearly absent [14]. While lockdown
measures should reduce intrinsic epidemiological clus-
tering down towards the Poissonian level, it is difficult
to see how they could reduce testing and administrative
pipeline clustering. A coincidence that occurred during
this least-noisy 7-day period, on 24 May 2020, was that
a full COVID-19 lockdown was implemented in Algeria
[21].
The Belarus (BY) case is present in all four tables
(Tables 1–4). The least noisy Belarusian counts curve
appears in Fig. 8. As with the other panels in the daily
counts figures, the vertical axis is set by the data instead
of starting at zero, in order to best display the informa-
tion on the noise in the counts. With the vertical axis
starting at zero, the Belarus daily counts would look
nearly flat in this figure. They appear to be bounded
above by the round number of 1000 SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tions per day, which, again, appears to be a psychologi-
cally preferred barrier. Media have expressed scepticism
of Belarusian COVID-19 related data [17, 2].
One remaining case of a coincidence is that the low-
est noise 7-day sequence listed for Poland (PL, Table 4)
is for the 7-day period starting 20 June 2020, with
φ7i = 0.16× 10±0.46. This is a factor of about 100 (or at
least 10 at about 95% confidence) below Poland’s clus-
tering value for the full sequence of its SARS-CoV-2
daily infection counts, φi = 13× 10±0.065, which Fig. 3
shows is typical for a country with an intermediate to-
tal infection count. On 28 June 2020, there was a de
facto (of disputed constitutional validity [36, 18]) first-
round presidential election in Poland. Figure 9 shows
that the counts for Poland during the final pre-first-
round-election week did not scatter widely throughout
the Poissonian band. A decimal-system round number
also appears in this figure: the daily infection rate is
slightly above about 300 infections per day and drops
to slightly below that. For an unknown reason that
does not previously appear to have been studied, the
intrinsic clustering of SARS-CoV-2 infections in Poland
together with testing and administrative clustering of
the confirmed cases appears to have temporarily disap-
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peared just prior to the election date, yielding what is
best modelled as sub-Poissonian counts.
Conclusion
Given the overdispersed, one-parameter Poissonian φi
model proposed, the noise characteristics of the daily
SARS-CoV-2 infection data suggest that most of the
countries’ data form a single family in the (φi, Ni) plane.
The clustering – whether epidemiological in origin, or
caused by testing or administrative pipelines – tends
to be greater for greater numbers of total infections.
Several countries appear, however, to show unusually
anti-clustered (low-noise) daily infection counts.
Since these daily infection counts data constitute
data of high epidemiological interest, the statistical char-
acteristics presented here and the general method could
be used as the basis for further investigation into the
data of countries showing exceptional characteristics.
The relations between the most anti-clustered counts
and the psychologically significant decimal system round
numbers (IN: 10,000 daily, DZ: 200 daily, BY: 1000
daily, PL: 300 daily), and in relation to a de facto na-
tional presidential election, raise the question of whether
or not these are just coincidences.
It should be straightforward for any reader to ex-
tend the analysis in this paper by first checking its re-
producibility with the free-licensed source package pro-
vided using the Maneage framework [4], and then ex-
tending, updating or modifying it in other appropriate
ways; see §Code availability below. Reuse of the data
should be straightforward using the files archived at
zenodo.3951152.
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